Recommended Reading

Michael Gibbons, Economic Theorizing in Lonergan and KeynesReligion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J., Edited by Timothy P. Fallon S.J. and Philip Boo Riley, (1987, Albany, State University of New York Press) pp. 313-26

Also available online at page 313: https://books.google.com/books?id=oyuYSv36a7sC&pg=PA313&lpg=PA313&dq=michael+gibbons,+lonergan&source=bl&ots=WtbSVCWVyL&sig=KTgAlB1vHhBgGLFDXOR6MMao1hw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjE392el7XbAhVojlQKHb_FAqYQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=michael%20gibbons%2C%20lonergan&f=false

 

Philip McShane: To inspect part of the background in physics which McShane brought to the science of Functional Macroeconomic Dynamics:

Mathematical Physics: Dynamics” Lecture notes prepared for a yearlong course on mathematical physics, a first year honors course in University College Dublin, 1959-1960.

Click to access McShane-%20Math-Phy%201-%20%201959-60.pdf

 

Bernard Lonergan gives a 3-page overview of the main features of the economic process.

Bernard Lonergan,  Insight, A Study of Human Understanding [CWL 3,  pp. 208-11/233-37  ]

 

Gjerstad, S. and Smith V.

Overspending in great amounts over long periods is facilitated by overlending by banks.  Neither banks nor entrepreneurs know the reason for, and the correct interpretion of, rising prices.

Previously I have suggested a lack of adaptation in the free economies to the requirements of the pure cycle.  …It is an inability to distinguish between the significance of a relative and an absolute rise or fall of monetary prices.  … the rising prices of the surplus expansion are not real and relative but only monetary and absolute rising prices; to allow them to stimulate production is to convert the surplus expansion into a boom (which must be followed out of systematic necessity by a correlative and devastating bust).  This I believe is the fundamental lack of adaptation to the productive cycle that our economies have to overcome. [CWL 15, 139-140]

Steven Gerstad and Vernon Smith address the overlending for housing in both the late 1920’s and the early 2000’s.

Gjerstad, S. and Smith, V.  Monetary Policy, Credit Extension and Housing Bubbles: 2008 and 1929Critical Review, 21: p. 269-300, 2009.

Gjerstad, S. and Smith V. “From Bubble to Depression?: Why the Housing Crash Ruined the Financial System but the Dot-com Crash Did Not,” Wall Street Journal, p. A15, April 6, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123897612802791281.html

Gjerstad, S. and Smith V  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yO0GCP1CsHk

Gjerstad, S. and Smith V,  Consumption and Investment Booms in the 1920s and Their Collapse in 1930; http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12794    (p. 81 ‐ 114)

Leave a Reply